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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

the Burnettes had not raised the claim in the original case, and no
miscarriage ofjustice resulted by not recognizing the exception.
Through summary judgment, the court denied both claims that
sought response costs. The court denied the CERCLA § 113(f) claim,
because the provision was only available to parties potentially
responsible for contribution costs which the Burnettes were not. The
court also denied the CERCLA § 107(a) claim, because although
Congress did express its intention that the Eleventh Amendment
would not bar a suit under the section, Congress did not have valid
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court ruled Congress acted within its authority when it
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment only once; the Court ruled
Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment only when
enacting legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CERCLA, enacted under the Commerce Clause, did not fall into this
category.
The court also ruled Connecticut did not constructively waive its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by engaging in an activity
regulated by Congress or by accepting federal funds.
Tiffany Turner

United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
brook where defendant discharged waste slurry from asbestos removal
project qualified as "waters of the United States" under the Clean
Water Act).
Employees of the defendant, TGR Corp. ("TGR"), performed
asbestos removal services for a Connecticut middle school. In the
process, the employees poured a waste slurry (comprised of mastic,
chemical mastic remover, water, and pieces of floor tile that contained
asbestos) into a drain in the school basement. From the drain, the
slurry traveled into a storm water discharge system, and then into a
waterway known as "Grasmere Brook."
The government charged TGR with knowingly discharging a
pollutant into the waters of the United States without a permit in
violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and
knowingly disposing and storing of a hazardous waste without a permit
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A) and 18 U.S.C. §2. The court
dismissed the latter two violations. The parties entered into a
stipulation agreement and the only issue remaining concerned
whether Grasmere Brook qualified as part of the "waters of United
States" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The district court held that Grasmere Brook was a tributary of Ash
Creek, a navigable water of the United States, and therefore fell under
the CWA. The court ordered TGR to pay a fine of $50,000 and remain
on probation for five years. TGR appealed.
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On appeal, TGR argued that Grasmere Brook was a "municipal
separate storm sewer" and a part of a "waste treatment system" and
was, therefore, excluded from the CWA under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. In addition, TGR maintained that the brook
was "designed and constructed to carry storm and other waste water
runoff."
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. It
acknowledged the broad meaning of "waters of the United States"
under the CWA and noted that several circuits have held nonnavigable waterways as "waters of the United States." However, the
court largely based its reasoning on the definition of both "waters of
the United States" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 and "municipal separate
storm sewer" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8). Under the latter
category, the sewers must be owned or operated by a public body
(such as a state, city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or
association). Testimony at trial established that no public body owned
or operated the brook. Furthermore, the court noted that the
exclusion for waste treatment systems only applied to manmade bodies
of water. Testimony provided at trial demonstrated the brook was
considered a "natural waterway housing aquatic life and water fowl."
The court held that as a natural tributary of a navigable waterway,
Grasmere Brook was part of the "waters of the United States" under
the CWA; TGR's discharge into the tributary violated the CWA; and
thus confirmed the conviction.
Karina Serkin

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that two citizens' environmental groups
did not have standing to bring an action under the Clean Water Act).
Gaston Copper owned and operated a non-ferrous metals
smelting facility on the waters of Lake Watson in South Carolina. The
company received a renewed National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit from the state Department of Health and
Environmental Control in February 1991. In September 1991, two
non-profit environmental organizations ("FOE" and "CLEAN")
brought suit on behalf of their members against Gaston pursuant to
the Clear Water Act ("CWA"). The suit alleged that Gaston exceeded
effluent limitations for various pollutants and failed to comply with
reporting requirements. FOE and CLEAN argued these violations
affected their ability to protect and improve South Carolina's waters
and also "affected the health, economic, recreational, aesthetic and
environmental interests of their members," residing in the vicinity of
waters that receive runoff from Lake Watson. Gaston moved to dismiss

